1
The terminology can be confusing, but I believe that the word lawyer, as used in Bleak House, is Dickens's collective term for both a solicitor and an attorney, which is how the word lawyer is defined in the OED and how most people did, and still do, use lawyer. Prior to the Judicature Acts of 1873, attorneys and solicitors maintained some separation in their professions (Robson 5) in that the term solicitor was "restricted to persons who conducted suits in the Court of Chancery" (Encyclopedia of the Laws of England 489). That is, solicitors practiced in the equity courts, and attorneys practiced in the law courts. Dr. Johnson may or may not have used attorney in a generic sense just as lawyer is often used; he may have been referring to an actual law-court attorney. For my purposes, I will use solicitor to refer to Bleak House's Tulkinghorn who is actually described as practicing before the equity courts and lawyer or legalist elsewhere, excepting, of course, those instances where attorney or attorneys appears in quoted material. Barrister refers to an entirely different profession that is not addressed in this essay.
2 The quotation is a little confusing with the "all male [sic]" reference. However, the word male is obviously a wrong word, so I believe that the proper reading of this phrase is "all mal and unfair practice," that is, "all malpractice and unfair practice." From Some of these stipulations, notably that concerning the examination by the judges, were difficult to impose, and were probably carried out in a perfunctory manner. And without this examination, the obvious fault inherent in the apprenticeship system -that it was too personal in character, varying from master to master -was allowed full scope for development. The attorneys were drawn from a wide variety of social positions, and their practices varied enormously from that of the great London attorney, to that of the small attorney in a country town. In consequence there was little hope that all attorneys' clerks would acquire even a certain minimum of legal education. (Robson 54) So, rather than just the criticism of the legal system (specifically the procedural deficiencies of the Chancery Court, which were a great concern roughly a generation before Bleak House and a well-recognized criticism by Dickens) , another, though related, reformist message seems to have been precisely what Bleak House's Gridley says it is, that is, the legal professionals themselves: Kirk' s footnote, I find that this passage comes originally from "Freshfield, Records of the Society of Gentlemen Practisers, p l." This text is digitized by The Internet Archive and available online.
3 While not germane here, Robson's discussion is interesting and details the Society's services to the profession, such as its removal of people like the notorious William Wreathcock from the Roll, its educational controls, its legislative activities, its protection of the profession from "encroachments of other groups," and its "many acts of benevolence and charity to distressed members of the profession and their families" (22-31).
"The system! I am told on all hands, it's the system. I mustn't look to individuals. It's the system. […] My Lord knows nothing of it. He sits there to administer the system. I mustn't go to Mr. Tulkinghorn […] . He is not responsible. It's the system. […] I will accuse the individual workers of that system […]!" (232; ch. 15) As S. Garrett remarks, "Most of the solicitors depicted in [Dickens's] novels would in these days have found themselves before the Discipline Committee of the Law Society" (48). But we do not need to judge the legalists of Bleak House by our own standards to determine the strength of Dickens's argument. Eighteenth and early nineteenth century standards were more than adequate for his audience to gauge the novel's reformist message about "the individual workers of that system […]!", and I believe indeed that one of the Dickens's primary reforming messages was to accuse the Tulkinghorns of the legal world of malfeasance and incompetency. 4 Questions of competency and honesty were recognized within the legal community prior to the publication of Bleak House. An article in the Law Times in 1843 in its first year analyzed the problems facing the profession particularly in relation to its status and discipline and stated its solution in capital letters: "'EDUCATION.'" Moreover, as I have mentioned, the Society of Gentlemen Practisers was organized in the early 1730s, aiming to control admissions and to take action against malpractice. However, over the years, the Society's usefulness declined. It simply was not intended to represent the entire profession: "It began and remained a London society for a select few chosen on the club principle." Subsequently, the Law Institution was formed in the early 1820s, likely by merging with the remains of the Society, and by 1846, the Law Institution became the Incorporated Law Society, being usually referred to simply as the Law Society. The Law Society continued with the Society's aim of "undertaking proceedings against offending attorneys." It also brought the issue of legal education to the fore 33; 49; (73) (74) (75) . 4 I would like to thank David Paroissien for directing me to the chapters on Doctors' Commons in David Copperfield, (1849-50) , which foreshadow Dickens's attack on the legal profession and its members in Bleak House. Two works in particular illustrate Dickens's criticism of the self-serving work undertaken by the proctors and advocates practicing in the five courts based there: Cuthbert Conyngham's Doctors' Commons Unveiled (1854) and Thomas Poynter's Concise View of the Doctrine and Practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts in Doctors' Commons (1824) . Bleak House, of course, remains more openly critical of solicitors specifically. According to my analysis, Tulkinghorn, after all, is guilty of much more than a general air of superiority. Thus, when we think of David Copperfield and Bleak House in these terms, specifically in terms of the professionalism of the legalists themselves, we are struck by how much more forceful Dickens's reforming message became in the relatively short time between these two novels' publications.
As an effort at improvement, examinations were provided for by the Solicitors Act of 1843, but this process was notoriously ineffective: "Mr Samuel Warren said that the examination would not have been passed by one in ten of the attorneys then practising; if he was right in his estimate then the legal knowledge of those already admitted before 1836 must indeed have been abysmally low." 5 A Select Committee was formed to look into the matter, and it made substantive recommendations in its 1846 report for both a better legal education and general education (53-56). Of course, at the time Dickens wrote Bleak House the Select Committee's recommendations
were not yet in effect, and the general dissatisfaction with the law and its practitioners continued, so we have a Bleak House full of legalists who reflect what Dickens undoubtedly saw, which was an abundance of deficiencies within the legal profession.
Of course, all things legal did not fill Dickens's world or the world of Bleak House, as Susan Shatto notes in her comments about the depth and breadth of "The Contemporaneity of Bleak House." In her words, the "life which Dickens responds to in Bleak House is the life that was going on around him as he wrote" (1), which I believe to be accurate with reference to the decade she suggests (1840s-1850s). But her argument does not account for -nor is it intended to -the then-existing laws or legal principles (like coverture) that certainly inform the novel's action just as much as those events, persons, and issues she outlines. The laws and legal principles current at that time, of course, cannot be confined to the 1840s and 1850s, so, although I agree with looking at the novel in terms of the "very recent past of the 1840s," my analysis is predicated on legal history that pre-dates that decade in order to advance my argument that one of the social ills criticized in the novel was the legal professionals themselves. My argument then suggests an additional, albeit legal, insight into the novel's contemporaneity.
To that end, then, although the world of Bleak House contains many legalists and want-to-be legalists, I want to confine my argument to Tulkinghorn who has, over the years, garnered intense scrutiny because of his behavior, particularly toward Lady Dedlock. We have, for example, authors who have defended Tulkinghorn on various grounds such as Stanley Tick, who says that:
If we are tempted to search for evil in his behavior, it is because he seems so remote, and because he is so firm an apologist for institutional values. But the careful reader cannot disregard the fact that Tulkinghorn's ungentlemanly suspicions about Lady Dedlock prove to be well-founded; nor can we deny that her secret is such as would dishonor the good name of Dedlock. (214) On the other hand, we have those who castigate him: "He is a thoroughgoing villain and his reprehensible behavior toward both his client, Sir Leicester, and Lady Dedlock should be soundly condemned" (Markey 758) ; similarly, he is a character with an "almost purposeless malignance" (Johnson 2: 765) . I am not sure that Dickens's reading public would have cared so much as to why a solicitor like Tulkinghorn did what he did as they would have cared that Tulkinghorn is the archetype of legal malfeasance. As A. H. Manchester explains, people wanted legal professionals who could deal effectively with the financial, social and political changes that began to sweep through the country during the mid-1800s, and that desire encompassed the need for competent and honest lawyers.
Insofar as competency and honesty are concerned, we know that both substantive and procedural laws were being developed to accommodate the changing social structure: "The great Lord Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, was in the process of creating through judicial decisions a body of commercial law suited to the rapidly increasing commercial needs of a great commercial country" while "seeking also to streamline the procedure of his court with a view to reducing unnecessary delay and expense" (Manchester 12 ). We also know that lawyers were now bound by the terms of the Solicitors Act 1729, which along with many other provisions, statutorily provided for the lawyer's oath of office, an oath wherein the lawyer promised to "truly and honestly demean myself in the practice" of law and "provided the foundation upon which all subsequent legislation relating to the discipline of the profession has been based" (Kirk 72) . In his representation of his clients, Tulkinghorn is subject to the laws then in effect. In his behavior toward his clients and to the court, he is answerable to the Law Society for any malpractice. So where does any question of his professional responsibility arise?
Before we can answer that -before we can accuse Tulkinghorn of anything -we have to ascertain what specific behavior we are talking about. The issue of professional responsibility plays out differently between Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock than from the way it does between Tulkinghorn and Gridley. In Bleak House, the "accursed Chancery" (231; ch. 15) has no direct part in the Tulkinghorn/Lady Dedlock relationship, whereas it does in the Tulkinghorn/Gridley relationship, which relationship is based exclusively on the "accursed Chancery." The reformist message about the dilatoriness of the Chancery process is not relevant here. Rather we are looking exclusively at the relationship between Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock in order to, as Anthony Julius would say, "gaug[e] the strengths" (47) of the novel's assault on legal professionals, that is, we are going to accuse Tulkinghorn, one of Tulkinghorn is undeniably Lady Dedlock's solicitor 7 as much as he is a solicitor for Sir Leicester. We know when we first meet Tulkinghorn that this is so when he reports that Lady Dedlock's Chancery "'cause'" "'has been on again to-day'" (21; ch. 2). Many things happen after that first meeting that lead Tulkinghorn to Lady Dedlock's secret, and, though there was never any love lost between the two, the surprising thing is that they do the unexpected: they negotiate their positions. But what drives their forced negotiations is not a mutual desire to achieve a positive solution to Lady Dedlock's difficulties. Tulkinghorn, after learning that Lady Dedlock and Captain Hawdon had been lovers and that Lady Dedlock had had an illegitimate child, seeks to make his position clear. To do this, he tells Lady Dedlock's story in the presence of Sir Leicester, cousin Volumnia, and the "languid cousin with a moustache" (601; ch. 40) by thinly disguising Lady Dedlock's identity: "'I suppress names for the present,'" he explains (605; ch. 40). In short, he tells her that he holds the secret, and, consequently, believes himself in the superior negotiating position.
However, in order to negotiate their positions, Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock will have to cede ground, or else they will have no agreement, and they do reach an agreement, at least of a sort. Esther Summerson, Lady Dedlock's illegitimate daughter, is at the core of their agreement. If her existence is known, Tulkinghorn fears the impact that the knowledge will have on Sir Leicester: "'I have no occasion to tell you […] that the fall of that moon out of the sky would not amaze him more than your fall from your high position as his wife'" (612; ch. 41). Interestingly, Tulkinghorn is worried because of two possible diametrically opposite events. Either Sir Leicester will react violently to the news: "'How can it be, if Sir Leicester is driven out of his wits, or laid upon a death-bed […] how could the immediate change in him be accounted for?'" he asks (613; ch. 41). Or Sir 6 I do not discount or minimize the pain that Tulkinghorn inflicts on Gridley, but as tantalizing as the lawyer-client relationship between Tulkinghorn and Gridley is, their relationship functions more clearly within Dickens's criticism of the Chancery Court -a legal institution -rather than with respect to the behavior of legalists themselves, as they are represented in the figure of Tulkinghorn and his interaction with Lady Dedlock. 7 There are really only three pertinent tests to consider: (1) Is the lawyer willing to help? (2) Does the client want the lawyer to help? (3) Has the lawyer appeared in the case? (Pulling 94) . As Pulling explains, virtually any action by the lawyer can be construed as consent to the representation (94-96). How or by whom Tulkinghorn is paid is not dispositive as to the second strand of the lawyer-client test (96-101). We have, however, Lady Dedlock's acquiescence to Tulkinghorn's representation on her behalf, which is tantamount to her consent, and enough time and paper has been expended by Tulkinghorn to give evidence of his direct engagement with the Court on Lady Dedlock's behalf to satisfy the third criterion.
Leicester will not react violently but rather remain devoted to Lady Dedlock: "'He might not be able to overcome that infatuation, even knowing what we know'" (613; ch. 41).
Lady Dedlock's concern, though, is quite different from Tulkinghorn's even though they are discussing the same set of facts: the Hawdon affair, Esther's illegitimate birth, and the resulting scandal. She is very fond of her maid Rosa, who is in love with Mrs. Rouncewell's grandson, Watt Rouncewell. She is concerned that if the Rouncewells know about Esther, then Mr. Rouncewell will do as Tulkinghorn suggests: he would "'no more [allow] the girl to be patronized and honoured [by Lady Dedlock] than he would have suffered her to be trodden underfoot before his eyes'" (605-06; ch. 40). This possibility is what drives Lady Dedlock to reach an agreement with Tulkinghorn: "'Can I save the poor girl from injury before they know [the truth]?'" she asks (609; ch. 41).
Thus, Lady Dedlock and Tulkinghorn begin their negotiations in earnest. Lady Dedlock makes her first offer, which is to sign a release wherein she would renounce any claim that she may have to Sir Leicester's estate in exchange for Tulkinghorn's promise not to expose her to the Rouncewells (609; ch. 41). The matter, however, does not rest here:
To arrive at an agreement, the minds of the parties must be at one, or, as it is put, there must be a consensus ad idem.
[…T]he late Sir William Anson, in his well-known work on the Law of Contract, laid it down as an axiom, that every contractual agreement could be resolved into an offer and an acceptance […] and it is extraordinarily helpful in deciding the vital question: "When is a contract entered into or concluded?" To which, Sir William answers, in effect: "When the offer of one party is definitely accepted by the other." (Jenks, The Book 397) At this juncture, there is no acceptance. Tulkinghorn rejects Lady Dedlock's offer: "'I will not trouble you, Lady Dedlock,'" to sign such a document, he replies (610; ch. 41). Lady Dedlock then makes a counteroffer, which is to give him her jewels or money in exchange for his not telling the Rouncewells and for allowing her to disappear (610; ch. 41). Again, Tulkinghorn refuses, saying, "'Your flight, Lady Dedlock, would spread the whole truth, and a hundred times the whole truth, far and wide. It would be impossible to save the family credit for a day. It is not to be thought of '" (613; ch. 41).
After rejecting these two offers, Tulkinghorn makes his counteroffer to Lady Dedlock. He proposes that she continue to keep her secret, that she will not flee, and that he will not take any action without forewarning her (613-14; ch. 41) . At this point, he is shaping the best possible arrangement that he can make for himself in order to ensure that nothing untoward happens while he contemplates the matter. His basic problem is that he does not know how Sir Leicester will react to the secret.
8 So, to that end, he has one final but very significant point: she must agree that they are to "meet as usual" and she agrees (614; ch. 41). Thus, we seem to have a meeting of the minds, a consensus ad idem.
Tulkinghorn might be prepared to argue about operating under the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement, but Lady Dedlock is quite prepared to operate under the letter of the agreement exclusively. Tulkinghorn has misread her and continues to misread her character. To rid herself of his influence and to cast off "any dread of him" she may have, Lady Dedlock "is now decided, and prepared to throw it off" (686; ch. 48), and she accomplishes this with one act. In Tulkinghorn's presence, she sends Rosa away with the Rouncewells. Not surprisingly, this action is what leads Tulkinghorn to believe that Lady Dedlock has breached their agreement:
"Why, Lady Dedlock […], I am rather surprised by the course you have taken." "Indeed?" "Yes, decidedly. I was not prepared for it. I consider it a departure from our agreement and your promise. It puts us in a new position, Lady Dedlock. I feel myself under the necessity of saying that I don't approve of it." (694-95; ch. 48) Tulkinghorn goes on to complain that: "[Your action] is a violation of our agreement. You were to be exactly what you were before. Whereas, it must be evident to yourself, as it is to me, that you have been this evening very different from what you were before. Why, bless my soul, Lady Dedlock, transparently so!" (695; ch. 48) All Bleak House readers can appreciate the fact that Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock have come to the negotiating table from completely different points: he from a professed concern about Sir Leicester, and she from a professed 8 I believe one possible solution he would logically contemplate is the separation (if not outright divorce) of Sir Leicester and Lady Dedlock. After all, he has always believed that Sir Leicester's marriage was a mistake -"'My experience teaches me […] that most of the people I know would do far better to leave marriage alone. So I thought when Sir Leicester married, and so I always have since'" (614; ch. 41), which suggests that he prefers severing the marriage relationship. concern about Rosa. We can easily understand that they never agreed by what standard her remaining "exactly [as she was] before" is to be gauged. Actually, that was never discussed; they agreed to "meet as usual" (614; ch. 41), which is a question of timing and location (that is, when and where do they physically get together) and not a question of behavior (that is, that Lady Dedlock is to behave or act in a particular way). She certainly did not agree "to be exactly what [she was] before," and she certainly did not agree to behave as she did before according to his idea of what constitutes "exactly." Lady Dedlock takes full takes advantage of that omission from the agreement.
Tulkinghorn's argument is that, even though they did not expressly agree by what standard Lady Dedlock's conduct was to be judged, they understood each other to mean that she would take no direct action regarding Rosa. He is mistaken. His education is deficient in his conception of what a meeting of the minds means, and, as further evidence of his deficiency, he reveals that Rosa was indeed not part of the bargain that they struck: "Yes. I recollect, Lady Dedlock, that you certainly referred to the girl; but that was before we came to our arrangement, and both the letter and the spirit of our arrangement altogether precluded any action on your part, founded upon my discovery. There can be no doubt about that." (696; ch. 48, emphasis mine)
Assuming for the moment that Tulkinghorn has a point, then we could look at Lady Dedlock's statement that "'I am to drag my present life on, holding its pains at your pleasure day by day'" (614; ch. 41) as a statement of her willingness to act according to his wishes. Likewise, it may be construed as a statement to do what he says but not necessarily to act as he wishes. After all, when she dismisses Rosa, she is as cool and aloof as she always is. She just happens to be doing, though, exactly what Tulkinghorn does not want her to do. At best, the statement is ambiguous and should be construed in the most favorable light so as to impose the least burden on Lady Dedlock, the person against whom Tulkinghorn is seeking to enforce the terms of their agreement. After all, an ancient equity maxim says, "That the [agreement] be taken most strongly against him that is the agent or contractor, and in favour of the other party" (Blackstone 380) . In other words, Tulkinghorn, a solicitor in the Court of Chancery, a court of equity, should be sensitive to and willing to abide by equitable principles, another of which is that "He who seeks equity must do equity" (Bispham 62) . He seems neither sensitive to nor willing to abide by any equity principle.
But feeling his superiority over Lady Dedlock, Tulkinghorn thinks that "This woman understands me" (696; ch. 48), yet, unbeknownst to him, she does, more completely, more fully than he suspects. And readers can rejoice when the great solicitor is out-lawyered by a non-lawyer who also happens to be a woman. Not rejoicing over the turn of event, though, Tulkinghorn declares their agreement void and announces that he will soon tell Sir Leicester of her secret (697; ch. 48). Again, no love is lost: Lady Dedlock "had long watched and distrusted [Tulkinghorn] who had long watched and distrusted her" (739; ch. 52). And we know the fate of both. Lady Dedlock flees and finally is found dead at the entrance gate of the burial ground where Captain Hawdon is buried (854-56; ch. 59). Tulkinghorn, after all, does not get the chance to tell Sir Leicester because Hortense has killed him (701; ch. 48), so the duty of disclosure then falls to Inspector Bucket who, after Lady Dedlock disappears, tells Sir Leicester the cause of her flight and the nature of the relationship between Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock (764-68; ch. 54).
Beyond their contractual relationship, faulty though it may have been, however, Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock have another relationship that can be viewed as an indictment of the entire legal profession. Setting aside now the contractual issues, I want to explore, first, the issues of legal professionalism in terms of what constitutes the lawyer-client relationship, second, what constitutes overreaching by a lawyer, and, third, how these issues may have impacted how Victorians viewed the law, lawyers, and the legal system as those issues play out in Tulkinghorn's interaction with Lady Dedlock.
First is the issue of the lawyer-client relationship. Tulkinghorn, as he asserts, has a lawyer-client relationship with Sir Leicester and concerns himself greatly with all things associated with Sir Leicester: Yet I argue that he also has a lawyer-client relationship with Lady Dedlock. He is her legal representative in a lawsuit involving her property (22; ch. 2); Sir Leicester has no ownership interest in the property and is not a party in that suit (21; ch. 2).
9 Tulkinghorn, thus, stands as a fiduciary to both 9 The idea of a married woman prosecuting her own legal rights is not quite as unusual as we might think. Richard Burn tells us that "Married women may, in certain cases, institute alone a civil suit in the ecclesiastical courts, as in […] a legacy bequeathed to her separate use" (1842, 185, emphasis in original) . George Spence tells us that since at least the Elizabethan period, in the Court of Chancery, "The husband could not plead for his wife, she must join in the plea, or plead for herself " (1846, 598). In Bleak House, Lady Dedlock is a party to a suit wherein she pleads her own claim to a legacy. We need to note that this sort of property is not a tangible chattel or real estate interest. It is a Sir Leicester and Lady Dedlock, and this position gives rise to duties of fair dealing as to both of them, and a solicitor (that is, Tulkinghorn) who presumes to act in the best interests of his client (that is, Sir Leicester) cannot prejudice the rights of another client (that is, Lady Dedlock). 10 We can clearly see that Tulkinghorn certainly intends to prejudice Lady Dedlock's rights when he insists that he is only considering Sir Leicester and goes so far as to ask Lady Dedlock to confirm that fact:
"And I would wish in conclusion to remind you, as a business precaution, in case it should be necessary to recall the fact […] that throughout our interview I have expressly stated my sole consideration to be Sir Leicester's feelings and honour and the family reputation. I should have been happy to have made Lady Dedlock a prominent consideration, too, if the case had admitted of it; but unfortunately it does not." (614-15; ch. 41) To which Lady Dedlock replies, "'I can attest your fidelity, sir.'" Thus, with a lawyer-client relationship existing between Tulkinghorn and Lady Dedlock in which there is also a contractual relationship, we have now to consider my second point that concerns Tulkinghorn's overreaching behavior. A lawyer is obligated to observe that:
The utmost good faith (uberimma fides) is required on the part of the legal adviser; and the general rule of public policy, which "chose in action": "Property falling under the description of choses in action of the wife, are debts owing to her, arrears of rent, legacies, residuary personal estate, money in the funds, &c." (R. S. Dennison Roper, 1841, 129). If we apply Jenks' explanation of the law (Short History 226) to the situation, then we see that although Sir Leicester has the right to insert himself into the suit, he could also allow Lady Dedlock to pursue her own legal interests, which in their case, is what he does. So, though we would expect that the longstanding legal principle of coverture would bar Lady Dedlock from any rights in the matter, she remains the named party in the lawsuit, that is, she is the person pursuing her own chose in action. However, even though the ownership of her property is clear, the issue of whether coverture would bar her from contracting with Tulkinghorn, then arises. Coverture, however, would not necessarily bar a Tulkinghorn/ Lady Dedlock lawyer-client relationship because married women could engage their own legal representatives; they would just have to have their husbands appoint them a legal representative , which Sir Leicester has done in the form of Tulkinghorn.discountenances transactions between persons who are situated in a confidential relation towards each other applies with particular force to the case of attorneys at law who are officers of the court, and are, on that ground as well as on account of the powerful influence which they exercise over the minds of their clients, restrained from dealing with those whose interests they have in charge. Thus, if a lawyer's actions prejudice the rights of a client, "Equity […] presumes the existence of undue influence" (Jenks, The Book 400). Tulkinghorn is more than willing, contrary to these principles, to sacrifice Lady Dedlock's interests in order to preserve Sir Leicester's, which behavior, we could say, is not really a preservation of interests but a perversion of interests.
This perversion of interests brings me to my third point, which is that Dickens's Tulkinghorn is a direct indictment of the overreaching and abuse occurring among Victorian lawyers and their clients on a regular basis, a fact that did not go unnoticed by readers of The Times who saw a leading article such as this one that said:
We believe that the time is rapidly approaching when the public necessities and the public will must triumph over […] the obstacles raised by personal or professional interest […] . This opinion has now become so strong and universal in the country that active measures for the reform of the law … are becoming the test by which a large proportion of the Liberal party are disposed to try the sincerity and the capacity of the present leaders.' (cited in Butt and Tillotson 183).
We can appreciate why the public was understandably interested in the abuses within the legal world by considering a brief example. The story appearing in The Times in early 1851 about a Chancery Reform Association meeting at which a barrister told an anecdote that, as Butt and Tillotson note, 'might have appealed to Conversation Kenge:
A young man in his profession … came to tell his father-in-law that he had at last succeeded in bringing a suit long in dependence to a termination. "You simpleton," said the grave senior; "it was by means of that Chancery suit that I accumulated the money by which I was able to give a portion to my daughter, your wife. If you had known which side your bread was buttered on, you might have made that lawsuit a patrimony for your children's children" (184) And we know that Tulkinghorn definitely knows which side his bread is buttered on and would have likely concurred with the professional "wisdom" of the barrister's anecdote. After all, on a comparative basis, Sir Leicester, his estate, and his baronetcy are worth infinitely more than any settlement or recovery available from Lady Dedlock's lawsuit. All settlements and recoveries in her suit are speculative at best. But, even though the barrister may have meant his story in jest, those on the outside -the litigants, the potential litigants and Victorian society in general -were tired of paying for the joke. Dickens's narrator makes essentially the same point in Bleak House:
The one great principle of the English law is to make business for itself. There is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently maintained through all its narrow turnings.
[…] Let them but once clearly perceive that its grand principle is to make business for itself at their expense. (579; ch. 39) Thus, Tulkinghorn is the embodiment of the English law making business for itself; he is the embodiment of those in the legal profession who are the cause of the unrest -the overreaching, self-indulgent, self-serving and abusive lawyers who are being criticized in Bleak House -Tulkinghorn, Vholes, Conversation Kenge, Guppy, and the "eighteen of Mr. Tangle's learned friends" (14; ch. 1) -and in The Times, which news source "kept hammering at the inadequacies of legal education, and at the eminent members of the legal profession who were thwarting legal reform" (Butt and Tillotson 186).
What we might not appreciate, though, when we read and study Bleak House is the fact that judges had the longstanding right and authority to deal directly with overreaching, self-indulgent, self-serving and abusive lawyers, but this disciplinary process was often "manifestly unsatisfactory" (Kirk 77) for which situation everyone seems to share blame, the judges for "neglect[ing] their duties" and the lawyers for just ignoring the 1729 Act (75). But, as important as the issue of discipline was (and is), Dickens seems more concerned about prevention, which, as suggested by Robson (12), means trying to prevent misbehavior by the legal profession rather than just punishing wrongdoers. How does England develop a more reputable, more socially responsible legal profession rather than how does one punish lawyers when they cross the line? So, to that end, Bleak House, while shining a light on legalists like Tulkinghorn who are overreaching and abusive, offers an explanation of one reason (if not the reason) why the profession was in such disarray: Tulkinghorn is representative of a profession that has no clearly defined concept of what its duty actually is or to whom it is owed. Legalists need to be educated about this rather basic concept before the rest of their education (such as it may have been at the time of Bleak House's publication) acquires any real meaning within the context of the nation's social changes. Bleak House addresses the issue in a rather straightforward fashion: a lawyer's "chief duty it is to act according to law" (Pulling vi, emphasis in original) such that he simultaneously "[administers] the law to others" while not being "singularly careless of the laws relating to" himself (vi-vii) . Even the somewhat creepy and vampire-like Vholes knows this principle and tells Richard so (584-85; ch. 39).
11 Tulkinghorn, though, is trying to split his loyalties with the not very surprising result that he fails to represent any client well.
Of course, Bleak House is a novel and not a how-to manual, so what it offers its readers is a reformist message and not a reformist plan. So, if we are going to gauge the strength of this Bleak House argument, in conclusion, I would note that the ancient principle is that a lawyer "is retained for his skill, as well as his integrity and diligence, and must exercise all these qualities for the client's benefit" (Maugham 116) . Tulkinghorn neither knows clearly who his client is nor feels any particular compunction to behave in a responsible manner even assuming that he knows whom he represents. Ultimately, though, I believe that all of Tulkinghorn's failures as a solicitor arise from his fundamental failure to understand and appreciate this first principle of lawyering:
Whatever relation, however, an attorney or solicitor stands in, as regards the courts in which he is admitted, he is, with respect to the client […] regarded as an agent, binding the client by his acts, and accountable to him for the faithful discharge of his duties; and he is not at liberty capriciously to abandon that client's interests. (Pulling 6, emphasis in original) And that duty arises as soon as the lawyer undertakes to act, which is certainly what Tulkinghorn has done for Lady Dedlock by representing her case in the Chancery Court, and he wrongfully (and unprofessionally) moves against her in favor of his perceived "higher" duty to Sir Leicester. As Gridley says, the problem really is the individual, or, more specifically, the Tulkinghorns who have a real question of professional responsibility.
11
Vholes, of course, has his own deficiencies in this area. He may have Richard's interests at heart, but we feel throughout, however, that we know what duty is really of importance to him, and it has more to do with a case that is "prosperously ended" so that he can collect "the taxed costs allowed out of the estate" (Bleak House 585; ch. 39).
